

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 10 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. C.C. STELLE

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. HAMID

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU
Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Mr. M. STAHL
Baron C. H. von PLATEN
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I. G. USACHEV
Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.K. WRIGHT

Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the one hundred and twentieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

It was agreed at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.119, p.39) that the first item of business today should be the discussion of the draft report to the United Nations drawn up by the Co-Chairmen. Additional copies of the text are now being distributed. Before I call on the speakers for today perhaps we could see whether we could agree on this draft report. I might point out that since it was reproduced there have been certain minor editorial changes, but as they do not alter the substance at all perhaps we could proceed on the basis of the copies now in the possession of delegations. There are certain blanks which will have to be filled in. If no changes are recommended I would suggest that --- subject to the completion of the blank portions, which we might entrust to the representative of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat --- the draft report could be approved.

Are there any observations?

Mr. LALL (India): There seems to be an omission from this report. I thought that this session was distinguished by the fact that we had recorded our first agreement of the Conference, in principle at least, on a direct line of communications by teletype or telephone between Moscow and Washington (ENDC/PV.118, p.52). I do not see any reference to that in this document, and I think that it was an important agreement of principle which should certainly be mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Might I say that there was informal discussion of that point yesterday. It was our feeling that the question of reference to it, since it was from a Soviet statement, should be left to the discretion of the Soviet delegation, and there was informal agreement that there need be no mention of it in the report.

Mr. LALL (India): May I ask why not, Mr. Chairman? This seems to us to be something which has been agreed at this Conference, and I should have thought that it should be mentioned. I should be glad if the Soviet representative would tell us why he would rather not mention it.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The study of this question has not yet been completed. Yesterday, at an informal meeting, the United States representative put forward some additional views of the United States, including a proposal to convene a conference of experts. These views were set forth, as was also a tentative list of technical and other questions which, in the opinion of the United States side, should be studied together with Soviet experts. There are many other questions that need to be studied. What form these negotiations will take is also not yet clear. Therefore we consider that it would be premature to include this question in a report, in which other so-called "collateral measures" are also mentioned.

In the report we have dealt in a general way with the situation in regard to the discussion of "collateral measures" and to mention especially one question, the discussion of which is, so to speak, not yet completed, would be premature.

In our next report, if the need arises and if by that time negotiations have been completed on all the questions that have been raised, this question will, no doubt, find its rightful place.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): May I say, as representative of the United States, that we believe that the inclusion of a reference to the very welcome statement of the Soviet delegation at our meeting of 5 April (ibid) is at the discretion of the Soviet delegation, and that we in no way insist on any mention of that statement, so that we are prepared to support the draft report as it stands.

May I take it that the Committee approves the draft report and requests the representative of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat to fill in the necessary blanks left for the number of meetings, and so on?

Since I hear no objection I take it that, subject to the changes which are unfortunately not before delegations but which, as I have said, do not alter the substance, the draft is approved.^{1/}

It was so decided.

^{1/} This report was subsequently issued as document ENDC/83

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): I hope that everybody in this room will agree with me when I state that our Committee is negotiating one of the most difficult treaties ever negotiated in the history of relations between governments, States or groups of States. It is not a matter of ending a war, of tracing a frontier, of setting up an offensive or defensive alliance, of establishing a principle of international law, of determining the extent of territorial waters or of outlining the system of law to function in outer space. This Committee is faced with the problem of problems of all time, and particularly of the era in which we are living: the problem of general and complete disarmament, on whose solution depends the settlement of all other international issues and, in the long run, the future of humanity. The position of the governments with regard to the main alternatives, peace or war, is assessed according to the way each of them regards that issue, according to the way each of them struggles for the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

The difficulties we have to overcome are great. The history of the past millenniums, unfortunately, has left us as a legacy the concept that arms decide who is right — the concept of "Faustrecht", the right of the fist, the right of the strongest. In our age, guided by their will to live in freedom and mutual understanding, people stood up against such a concept. Those governments which realize that war is not a means of settling international differences stand against such a concept. Our Committee too must stand against such a concept, for otherwise the very existence of our Committee would be senseless.

The delegation of the Romanian People's Republic has never cherished the illusion that the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament was going to be an easy task, a task to be accomplished without effort or without responsibility, but it has never ceased to believe that we can reach our goal if all present here — all Governments engaged in these negotiations — prove by deeds and not by mere words that they are struggling for the implementation of general and complete disarmament, that they are facing reality as it is.

The negotiation of this treaty requires a realistic approach. What does that mean? To be a realist in this issue means, in the view of the Romanian delegation, to put forward proposals which, transformed into binding commitments on the basis of negotiation, will bring about a modification of the prevailing situation.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

How does that situation appear and what are its essential features? Although the Romanian delegation is aware of the risk of repeating a statement which has already been made, it wishes to reiterate its profound belief that mankind in the past was never faced with such a situation as that obtaining today. Nuclear weapons have upset the realities and the thinking of the past with regard to war and the waging of war. Nuclear weapons have created the possibility not only of destroying armies and devastating comparatively extensive territories, but also of exterminating whole peoples and whole countries. Such a quantity of explosive material now exists in the world that peoples and countries in their entirety could be obliterated, not once but scores and hundreds of times. It is from that reality that we must proceed when putting forth proposals for general and complete disarmament. That is the reality which has to be radically changed.

What are the proposals we are discussing today in this Committee? In its draft treaty (ENDC/2) the Soviet delegation has proposed the elimination in the first stage of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles: The Gromyko amendment (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) has been added to that. The implementation of that proposal would mean in fact the elimination from the very beginning of the danger of a nuclear war being unleashed.

On the other hand, we have before us the proposal made by the United States delegation (ENDC/30) which provides for a 30 per cent reduction in armaments in the first stage, nuclear weapon vehicles included. I have already had the opportunity of demonstrating that such a reduction could not save humanity from the nuclear danger, could not give people tranquillity, security or peace. That has also been made clear by other delegations around this table. The United States delegation did not take into account the arguments adduced, has not examined them thoroughly or analysed them in the spirit of negotiation, but has shown an a priori attitude: ignore and reject.

That statement of mine rests on facts. For instance, here is a declaration made by the United States representative at our meeting on 3 April:

"We have not found a single argument in all of the recent speeches of the Soviet bloc delegations which would tend in any way to indicate any unfairness to them arising from the implementation of the United States disarmament proposal." (ENDC/PV.117, p.21)

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

I think that that way of considering things proves most convincingly a wilful ignorance of the arguments presented here during our negotiations. I think also that that attitude cannot be of any help to the progress of our negotiations. I want to assure members of this Conference that, by sticking to that position, the United States delegation cannot confuse or, indeed, make us forget the crux of the matter, and cannot discourage anybody from showing reality as it is.

That being so the Romanian delegation, armed with patience and perseverance, sets out to make clear once more the lack of realism and the danger implied in the gradual approach in the reduction of armaments proposed in the United States outline of basic provisions. In this connexion I intend to submit today the following facts for the consideration of this Committee.

In 1963 about 3,390 strategic weapons, major aircraft and missiles are to be available to the United States Air Force and Navy. Those major vehicles can deliver nuclear warheads with a total power equivalent to 21,970 million tons of TNT. That does not include the fighter planes, intermediate- and short-range missiles, torpedoes, mines, cannon and tactical rocket launchers such as the Davy Crockett, and according to certain estimates the United States stockpile of warheads is probably as much as twice the total which could be delivered by major aircraft and missiles now available.

Those data did not come to our knowledge through any public rumour or uncontrolled item of news. They were published in the Congressional Record of 16 January 1963, page 393-416. I think the Committee will agree with me that some credit is due to that official publication of the United States Congress.

Here a reasonable question arises: what is the possible military significance of this amount of nuclear power which it is asserted the United States possesses? Allow me to leave the answer to that question to Mr. Seymour Melman, Associate Professor of Industrial and Management Engineering at Columbia University, New York. In order to shield myself from any reproach that Mr. Melman has not the necessary political authority, I should like to stress that the opinion of this Professor at Columbia University was made known to the American public in the United States House of Representatives at its sitting of 18 March 1963 by Mr. H.R. Gross, Representative for the State of Iowa. Everything, including the data to which I have just referred, has been published in the Congressional Record, Appendix, of 18 March 1963, page A.1487.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Here is what Professor Seymour Melman says in a memorandum tabled as a document in the proceedings of the United States Congress:

"Let us call this relationship a 'Hiroshima equivalent' and let us use this in some military calculations that are at once nightmarish and realistic. On the entire surface of the earth there are now about 2,000 cities of over 100,000 population, containing about 600 million people. If every one of these cities were a target for nuclear destruction and if there were an allowance of 30 per cent of failure to deliver to target, then the U.S. strategic vehicles alone could deliver the equivalent of $2\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of TNT for each 100,000 people. Since it took only 20,000 tons to kill 100,000 people at Hiroshima, the United States now possesses an overkill capability on this global scale of 125 times".

That is the calculation made by Mr. Seymour Melman, as presented by the Representative for Iowa, Mr. H.R. Gross, to the United States Congress.

Allow me now to do a little arithmetic. Let us assume that the United States proposals were to be implemented, and that a 30 per cent cut were made in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. What consequences would be likely to flow from that measure at the end of the first stage of disarmament? Instead of 3,390 strategic vehicles, the United States would have at its command about 2,300 such vehicles, capable of delivering nuclear warheads with an overall explosive power of some 15,000 million tons of TNT. Thus, by the end of a three-year period, which would be the duration of the first stage according to the United States proposals, the United States alone would dispose of a nuclear capability sufficient to destroy the 2,000 cities of over 100,000 population each -- but eighty times over. I repeat: at the end of the first stage the United States would have a nuclear capability to destroy all the big cities of the world eighty times over.

That is pictured by the United States delegation as "a reasonable, fair, practical and politically realistic approach to general disarmament" (ENDC/PV.117, p.23). It is the "safe, sane and possible" (*ibid.*, p.18) way towards complete disarmament that the United States delegation is speaking about. It is the best possible illustration of "how much more in keeping with the pragmatic consideration of realities" (*ibid.*, p.20) is the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. (ENDC/30)

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

No, that is no sound and realistic disarmament proposal. Such a proposal is by no means in keeping with the fervent request of the peoples the world over that an end be put — and as soon as possible — to the danger of nuclear war. The implementation of such a proposal would be tantamount to the maintenance and perpetuation of the nuclear danger, as was stressed quite clearly on 3 April by the words of the United States representative himself when he said:

"Let us therefore start from that point by freezing the situation where it is." (ENDC/PV.117, p.22)

In other words, the United States wants to eat the cake and keep it, too.

Thus, on the top of all other shortcomings of the United States plan, we must emphasize its fundamental deficiency — that it does not take into account the realities of the day, the necessity to eliminate, from the very first stage of the disarmament process, the nuclear war danger.

That is precisely the superiority of the Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1.). That is precisely the realistic character of the Soviet proposals. Those proposals take into account the situation now existing. They take into account the necessity to eliminate, from the very first stage of the disarmament process, the very possibility of nuclear warfare.

It has been said here that the Soviet plan constitutes an appeal to popular emotions. Inasmuch as the Soviet plan meets — as in fact it meets fully — the aspirations of the peoples for peace and tranquillity, that is nothing but a proof of the consonance of the Soviet proposals with the challenges of the day. To put into concrete form the ideas and the feelings of the peoples through measures of a nature such as to ensure the tranquillity, the life and the future of the peoples — that is not a shortcoming but an absolute necessity of our era.

I cannot end this part of my statement today without making reference to another assertion made by the United States representative at our meeting of 3 April. Trying to ridicule the Soviet proposals, he said:

"In other words, mankind is to be saved from its present serious predicament by an ingenious remedy sponsored uniquely by the States of the Soviet camp" (ENDC/PV.117, p.18)

There is really no need to adduce arguments or evidence to make it clear that not only the socialist States but all peoples favour the idea of putting an end —

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

and as soon as possible — to the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. That is a well established fact. I should like just to invite the United States representative to study carefully the statements made in this Committee, not only by the socialist delegations but also by other delegations, in order to make sure what precisely is the ardent desire and aspiration of the peoples.

I avail myself of this opportunity to recall the fact that scientists of 36 countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, assembled last September for the Tenth Pugwash Conference, stated:

"We have reached the conclusion that in the process of general and complete disarmament, the early elimination, with adequate and effective verification measures and within a short period of time, of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction, would constitute a satisfactory beginning when linked with substantial reductions of conventional military forces and armaments and with the solution of the problems arising from the presence of troops and bases on foreign soil".

To those who deem it necessary to reproach the socialist delegations, which are insisting on such a content for the first stage of disarmament, with an alleged lack of realism I should like to answer that they are giving expression to the views of those who persist in regarding war as a permanent element of relations between States.

Those are some considerations which the Romanian delegation deemed it necessary to submit to this Committee.

Now, what is to be done?

The delegation of the Romanian People's Republic feels that it is possible to negotiate this difficult problem, which appears to be the touchstone of our talks concerning the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament. It is the duty of each party to take into account its own interests, the general interests and the interests of the other party. The Soviet delegation gave proof of its capability to meet the position of the other party halfway when it tabled the Gromyko amendment (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38) to its initial proposals (ENDC/2). It is now the turn of the United States delegation to take the next step — but by all means let it be forward and not backward.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

All the members of this Committee are in duty bound to contribute to the overcoming of difficulties, to the progress of negotiations. The Romanian delegation is fully prepared to listen to, to analyse and to discuss any proposal; indeed, it desires to do so and if it reaches the conclusion that a proposal is of such a nature as to promote disarmament it will support it. But we are equally decided to fight anything that may push us towards failure to reach our main goal, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Recently the armaments race has been gaining momentum at a threatening rate. That race can end in only one of two ways: either we must have a thermonuclear war, or we must throw all weapons onto the scrap-iron dumps by carrying out general and complete disarmament. It is necessary to speed up the pace of our negotiations in order to avoid the first result and to bring about the other. There is still time.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I have listened with great care, as I am sure have other representatives, to the speech just delivered by our colleague from Romania. I found myself very much in agreement with his opening sentences but, if I may say so with respect, I rather thought that in fact they answered the rest of his speech. May I explain? He said (supra, p.7) in his opening sentences, in effect, that we were engaged here in negotiating one of the most difficult treaties that had ever been attempted in the history of mankind. It is that fact which we must always keep before us, and it is because of it that we have to realize not only the immensity of the problem but also the immense difficulty that we face in getting rid of mutual suspicion -- and it is mutual suspicion that is our greatest difficulty in this matter. Therefore it would be unwise, to put it at its least, to try to concentrate too much into the very first stage of a disarmament measure.

Our colleague from Romania pointed out that nuclear weapons had changed the whole concept of war. That is true, they have done so, and therefore it is essential that during the disarmament process we should eliminate them, just as we must eliminate those conventional weapons which have torn apart this continent of Europe so many times in the last 2,000 years. But, in my submission, it would be wrong to attempt in the first stage, while mutual suspicions are still so strong, to get through the

great mass of the reduction even of that one type of weapon. We have to move gradually. We have to proceed from stage to stage, building up confidence as we destroy the weapons. Therefore, I did not follow Mr. Macovescu's argument when he claimed that the approach in the United States plan showed a "lack of realism" (supra, p.9) because in the first stage it amounted only to a reduction of a little less than one third of those weapons. He reminded us of the tremendous number of those weapons in the arsenals of the United States. I hoped he was going on to remind us of the tremendous numbers of them in the arsenals of the Soviet Union, but perhaps he has more ready access to the figures of the United States than he has to those of the Soviet Union. That I do not know, but at least he will agree that there are very massive stores in the Soviet Union as well. Therefore this argument is applicable equally on both sides; we must see this reduction on both sides, and each side has to be convinced that the other side is reducing. Therefore, when the representative of Romania tells us that this is not a sound and realistic disarmament proposal, I say to him that that is because he is putting undue emphasis on the first stage. The first stage is important, of course, but it has added problems since in it we have to start the whole process of disarmament, the process of verification, the process of building up confidence. All that has to be done in the first stage. If we seek to overload the first stage, the danger is that we may never start the process at all. I would far rather have us start on a first stage which was not as ambitious as our Eastern colleagues wish it to be, provided we were able to go on and complete the task. I would far rather start on a first stage which was not so grandiose and finish the task than bring about a break-down in our efforts by trying to put too much into the first stage. That, I think, is the greatest danger.

I agree with our Romanian colleague that this is one of the most difficult treaties that have ever been attempted in the history of mankind. Because it is so, let us approach it by all means with such speed as may be possible, but let us realize the difficulties and face them honestly, and let us not seek to overload the first stage. I really believe that that is the best way to make progress. That, then, is my answer to what our Romanian colleague said in his most interesting speech this morning.

I should like now to say a word or two again about items 5 (b) and 5 (c) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3), which we are still discussing.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

As this may be our last meeting before we go into recess I should like to express the hope that when we reconvene our Soviet colleague will be able to explain to us in somewhat greater depth than hitherto his Government's proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1., Art.5) that an agreed and strictly limited number of certain missiles should be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the second stage.

Mr. Tsarapkin might perhaps care to study again the statements made by Western representatives in connexion with that Soviet proposal, and I would refer him to those that were made at our 90th, 92nd, 93rd, 111th, 112th, 114th and 117th plenary meetings. In doing so, I would ask him to consider whether he can honestly continue to argue that he has fully or even adequately responded to the many requests for clarification put forward not only by Western delegations but also by those of the non-aligned States represented here. The representative of the United Arab Republic, for example, indicated in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 5 November 1962 that "much needed clarification and precision" was required and he suggested that discussion of the Soviet proposal "with a view to assessing its fuller meaning and consequences" merited the Geneva Conference's utmost attention (A/C.1/PV.1266, p.28). In that connexion, perhaps I could reassure our Soviet colleague that after reading again the records of the meetings to which I have specifically referred he will see that there has been no lack of Western interest in exploring that proposal.

Perhaps I could try to summarize the present position in the following general terms. The Soviet Union has now agreed that two-thirds of the disarmament process should take place under the protection of our respective nuclear umbrellas. The Soviet Union has also suggested that for one-third of the disarmament process -- I am referring to the second stage -- the security of East and West should be protected by something approaching the concept of a minimum nuclear deterrent. I refer as all my colleagues will recall, to the proposal retention of a strictly limited and agreed number of certain missiles. In other words, the Soviet Union is now prepared to accept a programme of disarmament during the greater part of which the peace of the world would be maintained by exactly the same method as it is at present, namely, by the balance of deterrent power. That is what our Romanian colleague was referring to this morning -- the grim nuclear power that hangs over us all. It is that which,

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

however uneasily, in fact maintains this balance in the world today. However much our Soviet colleague may try to smother that particular fact in a spate of words, that is now the Soviet Government's position.

Both sides, therefore, are now beginning to talk the same language -- in a somewhat different key perhaps, but still the same language. Both sides are now admitting that it is this balance of deterrence, this certainty of inescapable retribution for any act of aggression, which is, however much one may regret it, the basis of world peace today. My colleagues will recall that when speaking about how to prevent violation of a disarmament treaty Mr. Tsarapkin himself said:

"... any State which might venture to embark upon aggression would realize perfectly well that sure retribution would follow." (ENDC/FV.111, p.33)

Our Soviet colleague has not, of course, told us yet how much punishment would be sufficient, in the Soviet Government's view, to deter such aggression. Nor do I know -- and so far Mr. Tsarapkin has not enlightened me -- just how much damage the West would have to be able to inflict on the Soviet Union to deter it from violating the treaty. But Mr. Tsarapkin and his colleagues from the other Eastern States have taken up a good deal of the Committee's time during this session accusing the Western Powers and NATO as a whole of so-called aggressive intentions. I think that rather too much of our time has been taken up in that way; it is scarcely necessary to point out that those charges are completely unjustified, and in the main we treat them with the contempt they deserve. However, if we were to take the Soviet bloc's allegations at their face value, the amount of potential damage which, under Mr. Gromyko's proposal, the Soviet Union would have to be able to inflict on the West might well have to be calculated at quite a high level before the Soviet Government could be absolutely sure -- and nothing less than absolute certainty will suffice in these grim matters -- that such damage would be so devastating as to deter us. That is on Mr. Tsarapkin's own assessment of the West as he has put it to us.

I should like to make another point in that connexion. Under the Soviet proposal the threat of nuclear war would by no means be eliminated as Mr. Tsarapkin, admittedly with diminishing enthusiasm, has tried to pretend. Indeed, it is the threat of nuclear war -- I do not say nuclear war itself, I say the threat of nuclear war -- which is an integral part of any system of mutual nuclear deterrence. I do hope we

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

will not delude ourselves on that point. Without the ever-present and obvious threat of nuclear war, neither the Soviet proposal nor any other deterrent concept could be completely secure.

While I am on this subject I really think it is time that we all clearly distinguished between the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons and their actual use. To advocate deterrence is not to advocate use: very much the reverse. I agree so much with our Romanian colleague that general and complete disarmament is what we must keep working for, because it is the only security for the world and it is a heavy duty that rests on us all here -- and, despite our Soviet colleague's allegations to the contrary, it is the main task to which we in the West are firmly dedicated. But I want to stress that until we achieve general and complete disarmament both sides will continue to rely on the deterrent capability of nuclear weapons as the only way at this stage of preserving peace.

I would be the first to admit that that is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. That is why I regard the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament as soon as possible as our primary task. And, incidentally, it is why I wish that our Soviet colleague would engage a little less in polemics and a little more in serious negotiation with us. Let him discuss details with us; let us get into detailed negotiation in any way he chooses. I have suggested so many ways in the past; I have suggested working groups, expert committees, all sorts of ways in which to further our work. It is a pity we have not been able to agree on some of them.

Having said that, I would add that in so far as we believe that the Soviet proposal may represent a more realistic approach by the Soviet Government to this difficult problem of destroying nuclear delivery vehicles, I myself and other Western representatives here have indicated very clearly our interest in it and our willingness to explore its implications with our Soviet colleagues. In particular, I should like to draw Mr. Tsarapkin's attention to the lucid and stimulating statement made by our Canadian colleague at our meeting on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, pp.5 et seq.).

After all, the differences which still divide us in this field could prove to be smaller than we sometimes think. Clearly, under the Western proposals for eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles by progressive percentage reductions across the

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

board, a level of minimum nuclear deterrence will also at some stage be reached. The principles which underlie the Western position on nuclear delivery vehicle reductions and the principles which underlie the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127) seem to me, if I have understood the latter correctly, to be much the same.

The United Kingdom delegation has said on a number of occasions in the past that, while we regard the Gromyko proposal with real interest, our present assessment of it in the light of the meagre information we have about it is that it would be more appropriate to the third stage than to the second stage. The United States draft plan (ENDC/30) provides for the elimination by the end of the third stage of all nuclear delivery vehicles and all nuclear warheads in the possession of States. Thus it clearly envisages a progressive reduction to zero during the third stage, and at some point in that third stage reductions of those categories will fall below any minimum nuclear deterrent. We shall have to determine in the course of detailed negotiation just when that phase will be reached and passed; but, if all other disarmament measures are proceeding satisfactorily to both sides, and subject to the provision of satisfactory peace-keeping machinery, to which I should like to refer in a moment, there is no reason why it should not be reached at least before the end of the third stage.

The position thus is that under the present Soviet proposals the Soviet Union is willing to contemplate the retention of a minimum nuclear deterrent up to the end of the second stage of disarmament, when it will be dismantled: the West contemplates that point being reached during the third stage. My point here is to emphasize that in fact the difference between those two positions is in no way so marked as the Soviet representative from time to time seeks to imply. Of course, it is marked at the stage where our Romanian colleague took us this morning -- to the end of stage I; the positions are still substantially different there. But, as I have tried to point out, if one takes the whole disarmament process one reaches the point where there is very much less difference between the two.

I must, however, emphasize the link to which I referred a moment ago between passing that critical stage in the disarmament process -- when the nuclear deterrents are dismantled -- and the establishment of adequate peace-keeping forces. So far as the West is concerned, we have on a number of occasions pointed out that -- however unsatisfactory this may be, or, I might say, however open to propaganda attack and

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

misinterpretation it might be -- we do not propose to give up our present source of security until an alternative source of security has been devised and established. In the view of the West, that alternative source of security can only be adequate and effective peace-keeping machinery.

I presume that the Soviet Union is equally anxious to ensure its own security at that critical stage in the disarmament process. Indeed, if it is not equally anxious with us about that aspect of the problem it is difficult not to assume that it has other methods in mind for providing for its own security. In that connexion I am bound to ask what other methods would be available to any State for providing for its security once we had reached a position where it was no longer possible to rely on national armaments. What other methods would be available at that particular critical stage?

I can envisage only two reasons which could lead a State not to be concerned about the provision of adequate international peace-keeping forces. The first would be that the State in question would have secured the negotiation of a disarmament treaty which left with it alone a sufficiency of power to enable it to rely on its own resources; but that would mean that the treaty did not fulfil the principle of balance, and obviously such a treaty would not have been ratified by other Powers. The second would be the knowledge that it had taken measures to retain for itself certain clandestine weapons on which it could rely. Those are the only two circumstances I can envisage which would lead a present major Power to be unconcerned about achieving an effective peace-keeping force by the time that that critical stage in the disarmament process had been reached. I therefore feel confident that the Soviet Union, no less than ourselves, will be vitally concerned in seeing that an effective peace-keeping force has been established at that point. Any other attitude would be bound to arouse astonishment and even, in some people's minds, possibly an element of suspicion.

I shall, of course, be developing this whole question further when we discuss peace-keeping under the appropriate item of our agreed agenda. But I did just want to remind the Committee this morning of one of the reasons why I have suggested in the past that the Soviet proposal might be more appropriately related to the third rather than to the second stage of any disarmament scheme. It is because, under the

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Soviet proposals, there are no provisions for establishing any peace-keeping forces until after the end of stage II, that is, after the time when, under the Gromyko proposal, the deterrent will have been dismantled. That would leave a dangerous gap. Under the Western proposals the deterrent would be dismantled after -- I repeat, after -- the establishment of fully effective peace-keeping forces, namely, in stage III. I should be interested to hear our Soviet colleague's considered views on this point, because I am sure we must all agree that it is an essential factor in reaching a satisfactory agreement.

So let me conclude with a reminder that we in the United Kingdom delegation are still waiting for answers to a number of questions which we have raised at earlier meetings. I refer, first of all, to the implications of the inclusion of anti-missile missiles in the Soviet proposal, which has been referred to by my colleague, Sir Paul Mason (ENDC/PV.112, pp.9-10, ENDC/PV.117, pp.15-16). Second, we are awaiting also a reply to the points we have raised regarding the verification of remainders under that proposal. The Soviet idea that we should verify declared retained missiles by stationing inspectors on launching pads would seem to me to meet some of the difficulties of verification and for that reason we welcome it. But we do not see how this latest verification proposal, which Mr. Tsarapkin gave us fairly recently (ENDC/PV.114, p.40), solves certain other difficulties. Those difficulties arise from the fact that the lower the numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles permitted, the greater the need to ensure that the deterrent balance is not upset by illegally retained nuclear delivery vehicles. I should like to know what the Soviet Government's views on that complex and difficult problem are.

In conclusion, I should like to urge our Soviet colleague to come forward soon and reply to these various points. It really would help us, I think, to make progress. If he continued to adopt a somewhat negative attitude, some members of the Committee might conclude that he was losing interest in his own Government's proposal: and, in that case, I should very much regret that an opportunity to make some progress towards mutual understanding in this field might be lost. Therefore I do hope that we can get some further elucidation, because otherwise the continuation of the discussion of this particular item on our agenda may only lead to frustration instead of leading us forward.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): At four meetings in recent weeks the Committee has had an opportunity of discussing the measures envisaged under sub-paragraphs 5 (b) and 5 (c) of the agreed procedure of work (ENDC/1/Add.3), that is to say, disarmament measures regarding nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and disarmament measures regarding conventional armaments, which are two series of measures that should be applied during the first stage of disarmament. Discussions were necessary mainly because of the new Soviet proposal submitted to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly by Mr. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (A/PV/1127, provisional, p.38), providing for the retention of an agreed and strictly limited number of certain types of missiles to the end of the second stage, while all other nuclear weapon vehicles would be eliminated in the first stage.

These discussions served to define the positions and views of the two sides far more clearly and explicitly than before. As the Committee knows, further details and explanations were given by the Soviet delegation concerning ways and means of controlling the actual elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles and of checking the vehicles retained.

The main use of the discussions was that they served to bring out much more clearly the measures which the parties think should be applied in the first stage to the armaments referred to in sub-paragraphs 5 (b) and 5 (c) of this document. For the effective achievement of general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union considers that the process of disarmament must start with measures enabling irrevocable action to be taken from the outset towards the complete elimination of the military establishments of States by:

(a) effectively eliminating the danger of a nuclear war in the first stage through the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles; and

(b) eliminating military bases installed on foreign territory. As we all know these bases represent foci of international tension, particularly between the countries on whose territory they are installed and their neighbours. They are at the same time outposts for aggression by a country remote from the area where they are installed against the countries at which they are aimed.

(c) The Soviet plan provides for a 30 per cent reduction of conventional armaments. Here it will be remembered that the Soviet Union has made a substantial concession to the United States point of view in order to facilitate agreement.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

However, the United States and the other Western Powers think it would be necessary to proceed quite differently as regards paragraph (b), in a way which is seen to be completely and wilfully ineffectual -- I repeat: completely and wilfully ineffectual -- when the trouble is taken to look into the methods they propose. From their proposals and the explanations given by their representatives during discussions in the Committee they clearly intend:

(a) to preserve the possibility, and hence the danger, of unleashing a nuclear war -- I repeat: unleashing a nuclear war -- throughout the world, not only to the end of the first stage but even beyond the second and third stages of the disarmament process, assuming it was ever possible to reach the third stage under the United States plan; and

(b) to retain their military bases on foreign territory, thereby maintaining tension between States and thus disturbing relations between neighbouring countries.

(c) As regards conventional armaments, the United States proposes a reduction of 30 per cent -- a figure accepted, as we have already mentioned, by the Soviet Union. It would therefore appear that there are, thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Union, no divergences on paragraph (c).

It is interesting to note that unanimity has been reached both in the United Nations and in this Committee -- or so it would appear -- on the need to eliminate without delay the nuclear danger threatening mankind as the result of the development of nuclear weapons. But only the Soviet plan (ENDC/2/Rev.1) provides for the elimination of the danger from the very first stage of general and complete disarmament. The United States project (ENDC/30), on the other hand, does not -- as we have already pointed out -- provide for the elimination of the nuclear danger in the first stage; nor does it make any general provision for the removal of this threat, whatever statements the United States representatives make to the contrary. These statements you have certainly heard often enough; but they do not carry conviction.

In his "general considerations of disarmament" -- as he described that part of his statement on 3 April, the United States representative dwelt on certain fundamental observations which show that his delegation is opposed to any measure aimed at eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the initial stage of disarmament. Mr. Mark said:

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

"It is clear by now that the main argument advanced unanimously by the communist countries on stage I of general and complete disarmament is not an argument based on world realities or political experience. Rather, it appears to involve an incessantly repeated appeal to popular emotions, intended to build up pressure on the West..." (ENDC/PV.117, page 18).

Immediately afterwards, the United States representative added:

"That Soviet argument states flatly that the indispensable first step in disarmament must, in and by itself, completely eliminate the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war, by disposing of all or almost all, nuclear delivery vehicles during a first stage of twenty-four months. In other words, mankind is to be saved from its present serious predicament by an ingenious remedy sponsored uniquely by the States of the Soviet camp." (ibid.)

These general observations of the United States representative reveal a strong tendency to disparage the Soviet proposals in advance so as, by minimizing their purport and significance, the more easily to be rid of them. That method, Mr. Chairman, is one that sometimes backfires on those who use it.

However, what is more important is Mr. Mark's complaint about how discouraging it is to find that even now the socialist delegations still misunderstand the -- to use his own terms -- "firm" (ibid., p.21) Western positions, which are based on "world realities" and "political experience" (ibid., p.18).

What are the positions supposedly based on the said "world realities" and the said "political experience" that must presumably be taken into account throughout the process of disarmament? According to the United States representative, they are

"A general de facto balance of military power, or, at least, deterrence." (ibid., p.22)

He then asks the question: Why should we not start from that balance of military power, rather than complicate our task by seeking a new balance of military forces at each stage of disarmament? Again, to support his argument he states that under the agreed principles disarmament should "be accomplished without disturbing the international military balance ..." (ibid., p.18)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

It is interesting to note the recurring platitude in the Western representatives' statements that the disarmament process must comprise a "balance of forces" -- which, by their own logic, is tantamount to a "balance of terror". They even go so far as to claim that a balance of forces -- hence of terror -- is sanctioned under the agreed principles for general and complete disarmament. Is it not characteristic of their position that they can imagine no other world than one in which peace and security are ensured by military power -- by the balance of terror -- rather than by disarmament?

Paragraph 5 of the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) emphasizes that the aim should be, not a balance of military power -- I repeat: not a balance of military power -- hence of terror, but balanced disarmament measures, so that "security is ensured equally for all". What the principles envisage is, not security by force of arms and balance of terror, but security by balanced measures and general and complete disarmament.

To attempt to use the agreed principles in support of the argument that in the disarmament process -- in which, under the United States plan there will be no nuclear disarmament, even after the third stage, if ever that stage is reached -- to ensure world peace and security by force, and above all by the force of nuclear weapons, would be tantamount to saying that disarmament would consist solely in the balance of military power, which is in direct contradiction with the very idea of general and complete disarmament.

There is no room for the balance of terror in general and complete disarmament. On the contrary, the very concept of general and complete disarmament is fundamentally opposed to the maintenance of any balance of armed forces and to the very existence of such forces in the States called upon to maintain the balance. It is therefore permanently inconsistent with the Western delegations' argument that peace and security should be based on force and the balance of forces.

The Western argument that account must be taken of "world realities" and "political experience" would come down to maintaining the balance of terror during the disarmament process. But these so-called "realities" are precisely what the world wishes to get rid of by disarmament. There is, however, another, stronger, reality, which the Committee cannot ignore: the desire of the peoples of the world for the earliest possible -- immediate, if possible -- elimination of the danger of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

This "popular emotion" -- to borrow the United States representative's expression -- the peoples' desire to have the danger of a nuclear war eliminated, is something the Western Powers do not want, something they seek to ignore and evade. But we socialist delegations think that this popular desire to have the danger of nuclear war eliminated is precisely one of the realities that must be taken into account in our negotiations.

Seeking to refute the point made by our delegation that the method advocated in the United States proposal of making so-called "across-the-board" percentage reductions was calculated to speed up and stimulate the armaments race because the parties would want to secure an optimum arms mix before the treaty was signed, the United States representative said in his statement of 3 April that the United States "is ... quite satisfied right now with its own mix" (ENDC/PV.117, p.22).

Recent events, however, show that it is precisely with their own mix that the Western Powers, and particularly the United States, are not satisfied. In recent years, since the advent of the Kennedy Administration -- and certainly even earlier -- the world has witnessed a series of measures by the United States Government designed to speed up the armaments race in the United States and to substantially alter its arms mix.

The process is right now in full swing. Thus we learn from the 1 April issue of the United States News and World Report that of recent years the United States Secretary for Defense, Mr. McNamara, has ordered the abandonment of a dozen new weapons, whose production was said to have already cost the United States several thousands of millions of dollars, and an attempt to replace them by others, certainly more effective from the point of view of the Secretary of State and from that of the Pentagon.

In the same connexion, it may be not without point to recall that the creation of the NATO multilateral force also involves a review, a basic modification of the Western Powers' arms mix. More important still is the fact that all recent events show that this process is clearly being and will clearly be continued by the United States and the other Western Powers. It is accordingly clear that the methods proposed by the United States are not only not leading to general and complete disarmament but are inducing the governments of the Western Powers to continue the armaments race and to seek a change in their present arms mix for the purpose, inter alia, of acquiring military advantages at some stage of the disarmament process.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

The Western Powers are going even further. By their efforts to establish a NATO multilateral force they are now seeking to involve Western Germany and its militarists in the process of modifying the arms mix. The said militarists, as is well known, are trying to come by nuclear weapons as a means towards realizing their revanchist dreams.

It is true that the other day the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, who spoke before me today, assured us that the policy of Western Germany -- a "loyal member" of the NATO alliance (ENDC/PV.115, p.38) -- was in no way akin to the aggressive policy of Hitler's Germany. But it would be dangerous to close one's eyes to the fact that Western Germany is avidly aspiring to the control of nuclear weapons and pursuing a policy designed to ensure it a predominant role in NATO.

Now, from the logic of our Western colleagues' argument, the establishment of a NATO multilateral force would tie the hands of Federal Germany and prevent it from manufacturing its own nuclear weapons. That is the sort of logic that is applied to our discussions. Such a contention leaves us somewhat more than perplexed.

For many years we have been assured that the Paris Agreements signed in 1954 were a sufficient guarantee against the nuclear rearmament of Federal Germany. But the Paris Agreements seem no longer adequate to tie Western Germany's hands. So the idea is advanced of new agreements with the Germany of Bonn providing, strangely enough, for further concessions to that country on the pretext of "tying its hands" -- the expression used by the Western delegations -- in the nuclear field.

By this new effort to strengthen the bonds between Western Germany and NATO the Western Powers are conceding nuclear weapons to that country. In that connexion it would be timely to recall the following statement -- reported in the German Press -- by the former Minister of War of Western Germany, Mr. Strauss, to a meeting of senior officers:

"Our first duty is to discharge our military obligations to NATO.

But once the Bundeswehr is on a military footing we shall begin to address the supporters of relaxation in international tension in true German language" -- what he means by German language is of course his own business -- "and we shall show them who really controls NATO."

That time would appear, in the view of the leaders of Western Germany, to be very near.

In order to gain possession of the nuclear weapon, the militarists of Western Germany are ready to devote ever greater sums to the armaments race, and above all to

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

nuclear armaments. The New York Times, in an article of 9 March entitled "Bonn will Contribute in the Largest Measure the Expenditure incurred by the NATO Fleet", said:
(continued in English)

"Up to 40 per cent of the crews of the missile-firing ships of the proposed NATO nuclear fleet are West Germans. Together, the United States and Western Germany are scheduled to provide at least 75 per cent of the money and manpower for the fleet of 25 Polaris-equipped surface ships.

This plan was conceived to meet Bonn's demand for atomic equality."

(continued in French)

The Western Powers' policy of creating the NATO multinational force, and thereby of modifying the arms and nuclear weapons mix, will therefore clearly have a disastrous effect. In that connexion we fully support the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Lothar Bolz, who stressed the following point in the letter he sent to the two co-Chairmen of our Conference:

"Participation in any sort of NATO nuclear force by the German Federal Republic and the Hitlerite generals commanding its armed forces is bound to undermine any attempt to come to terms about ending nuclear armament, leave alone that this would make general and complete disarmament highly improbable." (ENDC/81, p.2)

In the light of these dangerous developments, there is one way of putting an end to the aggressive preparations of the West-German revanchists, as well as to the future spread of nuclear weapons, namely, to eliminate from the very beginning of the disarmament process any possibility of nuclear aggression.

This brief review of the respective positions on the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the Western Powers' reactions to the Soviet Union proposal concerning the retention of a strictly limited number of certain types of missiles during the second stage of disarmament shows that they do not offer immediate prospects of agreement on this important point, which is at the very root of the practical elimination of the danger of a nuclear war. On the contrary, despite their statements that the new Soviet proposal was of great interest to them, and despite their requests for further information on it -- the United Kingdom representative today submitted more requests and asserted that the Soviet Union delegation had not fully met his requests for information (*supra*, p. 20), as though the Western Powers were prepared to agree to the proposal, which is at least what he suggested -- the Western Powers finally stiffened

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

their uncompromising position even more in discussion. Instead of following the conciliatory and flexible lead of the Soviet Union, which -- as you will recall -- agreed during negotiations to make several concessions to the Western Powers, these Powers are on the contrary trying to raise even greater obstacles to agreement.

Yet, if agreement is to be reached on general and complete disarmament, the Western Powers must change their attitude and aim, not at ensuring a balance of forces, hence of terror, but at finding ways and means of removing, from the very beginning of the disarmament process, the danger of a nuclear war that hangs over humanity. They must not disregard the desires and hopes expressed by the peoples of the whole world for the earliest possible elimination of that danger.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria does not despair of the Western Powers' seeing reason and reconsidering their position on this question, which is of cardinal importance for the success of our future negotiations.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): At today's meeting we deem it necessary to make some remarks in connexion with the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada on the proposal put forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union at the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 1962 (A/PV.1127 (provisional), p.38). Before dealing with questions directly related to the Soviet proposal, we are compelled to touch upon certain general points in connexion with the statement of the United States representative at our meeting on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, pp.17-26).

At that meeting the United States representative set himself the task of stating the United States general concept and approach in regard to the problem of disarmament. It must be said that his statement showed more clearly than ever that when the United States speaks of disarmament it is in fact very far from taking the path of real disarmament. From the remarks made by the United States representative it is obvious that the United States considers the discussions in this Committee only as a means for achieving its political and military aims, although in his statement the United States representative was not sparing of assurances that the proposals of the United States (ENDC/30) were a model of political realism and justice and of a practical approach to solving the problems of disarmament. However, those were no more than resounding hollow phrases having nothing in common with reality.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The United States representative took on the impossible task of demolishing the Soviet proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1). Like the fabled dwarf who boasted of uprooting a mighty century-old oak, Mr. Mark, a member of the United States delegation, made his onslaught on the main part of our proposals aimed at the immediate elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war. He acted quite simply: he stated categorically that the Soviet proposals were not based on the realities of the international situation or political experience. What proofs did Mr. Mark bring forward to justify this categorical assertion? I shall quote his own words from the verbatim record:

"... it appears to involve an incessantly repeated appeal to popular emotions, intended to build up pressure on the West to adopt a Soviet disarmament plan favouring the military, political and strategic interests of the East in an entirely one-sided fashion." (ENDC/PV.117, p.18)

That sentence is very remarkable. It contains quite a number of thoughts. In the first place it reveals that Mr. Mark looks upon so-called "popular emotions" in a definitely negative manner and with unveiled hostility. If we translate it into language that everyone can understand, what he means by "popular emotions" is the mood of the broad masses of people, who demand the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. That sentence of Mr. Mark's shows that he interprets the appeals and demands of the peoples of the world for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war as pressure on the Western Powers. On the other hand, that statement of the United States representative is a frank admission that the demand for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war is not taken into account in the plans of the Western Powers; that the Western Powers are against the elimination of this threat and want to maintain it. Only in this way can we explain why the demand of the peoples for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war is regarded by the United States representative as pressure on the Western Powers.

Finally, from that remark by the United States representative it is easy to perceive the admission that the Western Powers regard the elimination of the nuclear threat as a factor answering to the interests of the socialist countries and contrary to the interests of the capitalist, imperialist countries of the West. Whether or not it was his intention, the United States representative, Mr. Mark, on the one hand, testified to the reluctance of the West to solve the main problem

(Mr. Tseraplin, USSR)

of disarmament, the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and, on the other hand, confirmed that the interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which demand the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war, coincide with the sentiments and aspirations of all peoples.

Since the representative of the United States has plunged into arguments on the subject of political realism, it will do no harm to go a little deeper into this question and ask the United States representative which approach to the problem of disarmament is more in keeping with political realism -- the one which is in accordance with the interests of the peoples and takes into account their aspirations, or the one which represents the demands of the masses as "popular emotions", as a kind of hostile act and as a form of pressure on the Western Governments? In my opinion, there can be no doubt about the answer. The only approach which can be politically realistic is the one which is in accordance with the demands of the peoples. If we are going to talk about the pragmatic realism of the United States proposals, then it consists in the fact that these proposals give primary importance not to the interests of the peoples, as Mr. Mark virtually admitted, not to solicitude to ensure their security and welfare, but to something else. Everyone understands that something to mean the interests of the circles making huge superprofits in the armaments race, circles which, for the sake of their mercenary interests, are prepared to keep the world under a permanent threat of nuclear war. It is always a question of the same "United States military -- industrial complex".

In the heat of polemics, the United States representative levelled at us the reproach that in its proposals the Soviet Union has been guided by "its own immediate political interests". (ibid., p.19)

In saying this, the United States representative by no means discovered America. Any proposal made by any government is always dictated by political interests and considerations. This is absolutely true for all times and all peoples and, I admit, it is even rather awkward to remind the United States representative of this. At the same time we must note that interests are not all the same: there are interests and interests.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union displayed great initiative in putting forward its proposal on general and complete disarmament. In doing so, what political interest was the Soviet Union pursuing? Its only interest was to ensure solid and lasting peace for the peoples. Mr. Mark saw in it a desire to secure a radical change in the world strategic balance in favour of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the United States representative general and complete disarmament would be a terrible danger to the United States, as it would radically upset the strategic position of the United States. It should be noted, however, that in objecting to the Soviet proposals, the United States representative is himself taking a political position. The only difference is that the political position of the United States representative is contrary to the interests of peace, to the interests of the peoples and to the interests of the cause of disarmament. So, let us emphasize once again, there are different political interests. We are defending peace and disarmament, that is, the political interests of the peoples, while Mr. Mark is defending here the political and economic interests of armaments manufacturers, the merchants of death.

All the objections we have heard from the Western Powers to the Soviet proposals for ending the danger of nuclear war in the very first stage by eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons boil down to two arguments: first, that the Soviet proposals disturb the "balance of forces" and, second, that they do not ensure reliable control. These two arguments have been rehashed in various ways from meeting to meeting by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada. Let us examine these arguments.

The representative of the United States asserted (*ibid.*, p.20) that the implementation of the first stage of the Soviet disarmament programme would lead to the fragmentation of the remaining armed forces of the West, while the main forces of the socialist States, that is, the Soviet armed forces, would remain a single and centralized military machine. The United States representative said that the main armed forces of the East were those of the Soviet Union. Consequently, by analogy, the main forces of the West should be considered to be those of the United States. Where, then, does the argument of the United States representative about the fragmentation of the main forces of the West come in? So far we are unaware of any facts to indicate that the armed forces of the United States would

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

be fragmented or be in the process of fragmentation. All this is merely a figment, obviously intended to confuse the issue. It would be interesting to ask the United States representative what causes would lead to the dismemberment of the main forces of the West. The United States representative has told us that he considers that the elimination of military bases on foreign territories would lead to the falling apart of the military bloc of the Western Powers.

The representatives of the Western Powers are terribly indignant when the representatives of the socialist countries point out the real purpose of the United States military bases on foreign territories, namely, aggression and the political subjugation of peoples. The Western representatives assure us that these bases were set up with the free consent of the States concerned and that they are necessary for the defence of the peoples whose Governments have made their territory available for the stationing of such bases. Now the United States representative himself does not conceal the fact that the United States regards its bases on foreign territories as shackles to keep the peoples of the West European countries within the framework of the United States military machine called NATO. Remove these shackles, and as Mr. Mark told the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the military bloc of the Western States will fall apart. Perhaps without realizing it himself, the United States representative has admitted the constraining nature of the links existing in the NATO bloc. The Western world, held together by the chain of United States bases, is an unstable world. Only the elimination of foreign military bases on the territory of other States and disarmament will lead to normal relations between peoples, to mutual trust and to peace.

The United States representative assured us that the United States proposals would preserve the equilibrium and would cause no harm to anyone. It is significant that he studiously rounded off his sentences and tried to get away with general declarations. But words cannot serve as a substitute for facts and honest analysis. We had already analysed the United States proposal in detail using facts and data and have shown that their ultimate aim is to weaken the medium-sized and small States and to increase even further the relative military power of the big States possessing nuclear weapons. Our arguments have in no way been shaken by the United States representative.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In his attempt to find justification for the United States position which rejects the liquidation of foreign bases and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, the United States representative went so far as to revise the basic principles of disarmament agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States in September 1961 (ENDC/5). His arguments at the meeting of 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, pp. 17 et seq.) were aimed at adjusting the agreed principles to the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty (ENDC/30). But everyone understands that it is necessary to do exactly the opposite -- we must draw up our disarmament plan in such a way that it conforms to the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations. We consider it our duty to draw the attention of the members of the Eighteen Nation Committee to this. It is impossible to tolerate the attempt of the United States representatives to revise the agreed principles. This attempt is aimed at undermining the very basis of our negotiations.

The agreed principles provide for the implementation of disarmament by stages; they do not at all envisage disarmament according to the United States pattern, that is, by percentages, as the United States representative tried to maintain. If we follow the approach of so-called progressive percentage reductions, which the United States has been insisting upon, stages are altogether meaningless. They become far-fetched and artificial. What need at all is there for stages, if the measures of one stage do not differ in any way from those of another stage, if, as would seem to follow from the statements of the United States representative, they all have the same objects? These stages would merely be artificial barriers; they would become an obstacle to the continuous, successive implementation of disarmament. Strictly speaking, that is evidently the role assigned to stages under the United States plan. It is no mere accident that transition from one stage to the next has already been used by the United States delegation as the main justification for refusing to name a specific period of time for the implementation of the disarmament programme.

The situation is quite different if independent particular objects are assigned to each stage. Then the stage becomes of real importance as a factor contributing to the implementation of general and complete disarmament. By the way, if we turn to the history of how this question of stages arose, it is easy to see that it was precisely the need to achieve, in the course of disarmament, objects differing in their nature and importance which gave rise to the concept of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

stages. The Soviet approach is in accordance with the agreed principles; the United States approach, on the contrary, is aimed at circumventing those principles and replacing them.

This conclusion inevitably springs to mind also from the arguments of the United States representative to the effect that the principles prescribe the maintenance of "the international military balance". (ENDC/PV.117, p.18). There is nothing of the kind in the principles nor could there be. The principles clearly and firmly prescribe only one condition, namely, that disarmament must be implemented in such a way that no State or group of States could gain military advantage at the expense of another State or group of States. But this is rather different from the thesis of the so-called "international military balance" which the United States has been advocating.

The confusion into which the United States representative fell can be seen from the fact that when he began to speak about the composition of the armed forces of States, "international military balance" became for him a synonym of the armaments race. This is not surprising. After all, the notorious thesis of the "international military balance" serves precisely as the favourite argument of the advocates of the armaments race, who are striving for its ever greater intensification. To read into the agreed principles what the United States representative has been trying to ascribe to them is tantamount to substituting the armaments race for disarmament. The agreed principles envisage equality with regard to security and not some sort of military balance. In the conditions of the frenzied armaments race and intensive military preparations, in the conditions where the threat of a nuclear war is maintained and becomes greater every day, it is impossible to count on the security of States. Any State depending on this kind of security is like a tightrope-walker balancing himself on a tightrope stretched over an abyss. But to eliminate immediately the danger of a nuclear war would mean to ensure real security for peoples and States. This is the real meaning and the value of the agreed principles and we shall resolutely oppose the attempts of the Western representatives to base themselves on these principles in order to justify the armaments race and to refuse to adopt measures aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war, as the United States representative tried to do at the meeting on 3 April.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

We have repeatedly pointed out that at the present time when a frenzied nuclear armaments race is being carried on and intensive military preparations are being made, the main and most urgent disarmament task is to protect the peoples of the world by eliminating the terrible threat of a nuclear missile war which is hanging over mankind. This task can be accomplished in an immediate and radical way by prohibiting nuclear weapons, liquidating all stockpiles and putting an end to their production.

There is another possible indirect solution, namely, the liquidation of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets. Without their means of delivery, nuclear weapons will not be able to reach their targets. They will be immobile in the depots -- a deadweight, if one can so speak of nuclear weapons, the most deadly and destructive of all weapons -- and will await their own destruction instead of destroying people. The Soviet Union is prepared to agree to either the one or the other. Appropriate measures are contained in the Soviet draft treaty on disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and in the statements of the Soviet representatives. But the United States outline for disarmament (ENDC/30) does not provide for the prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the first or second or even in the third stage. Neither in the first nor even in the second stage of disarmament does it provide for the elimination of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

The Canadian representative, General Burns, speaking at the meeting on 3 April in defence of the United States disarmament plan, admitted that it would not eliminate the danger of nuclear war. In doing so, he took the risk of trying to find a justification, to underpin, so to speak, the position of the Western Powers with a "scientific basis". He made the following striking statement:

"... we do not believe that this world can ever completely rid itself of that danger as long as a knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons exists". (ENDC/PV.117, p.10)

In those words the Canadian representative expressed the specific concept of the Western Powers and their attitude towards nuclear disarmament. They consider it to be impossible; they reject it.

But can the peoples of the world reconcile themselves to the monstrous, nightmarish prospect which General Burns promises them? If such an outrageous concept of a permanent, unceasing threat of a nuclear missile war is an integral

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

component of the political systems now prevailing in the West, then it is quite obvious that the exasperated peoples will in the end sweep away such systems and will establish such regimes as will banish war from the life of mankind.

As one of the arguments against the Soviet proposal for the elimination in the first stage of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons, with the exception of a strictly limited, agreed number of missiles to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union until the end of the second stage of disarmament, the Canadian representative made reference to the existing "apparent disparity" (ibid., p.9) between the number of intercontinental missiles possessed by NATO and the number of such missiles possessed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. He reached this conclusion on the basis of the figures of the British Institute of Strategic Studies. True, he made the reservation that in drawing this conclusion he did not know whether the figures for the number of missiles possessed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization which he used for comparison with the number of missiles possessed by NATO were accurate. He none the less came to a rather doubtful conclusion concerning the "apparent disparity" in favour of NATO, of course in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The reference to the "apparent disparity" in intercontinental ballistic missiles was necessary in order to confirm that the Western Powers have an "apparent superiority" over the Soviet Union in regard to the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles; and since they have this superiority, it must be maintained. How is this to be done? By means of the percentage reductions envisaged in the United States Outline. First of all I should like to put a brake on the flight of General Burns' imagination and bring him down from the clouds of the British Institute of Strategic Studies to the firm ground of real facts. These facts are to be found in the same statement of the Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union, Marshal Malinovsky, which was quoted by General Burns at the meeting on 3 April. We noted that in the quotation adduced by General Burns (ibid.) there was an inaccurate rendering of what Marshal Malinovsky said, and this inaccuracy related precisely to those data which made it possible for the Canadian representative to draw the conclusion regarding the so-called "apparent disparity" in favour of NATO in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles. On 22 February Marshal Malinovsky said, and I quote the official text of this speech:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"In his recent statement the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, speaking at a session of the Armed Forces Commission of the United States Congress, stated that the United States had over 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and approximately 140 Polaris missiles installed in nuclear submarines. He stated frankly that these forces could destroy the Soviet Union without the help of tactical aircraft units deployed at bases, aircraft carrier formations, or intermediate range ballistic missiles.

"This is not the first time that Mr. McNamara has spoken out. He made similar statements earlier, and all those statements were aimed at one thing only -- a further whipping up of the military hysteria and the armaments race, which has already brought humanity to the brink of war.

"If Mr. McNamara is determined to follow that road as Minister of Defence he first of all should weigh up the real facts and reflect on where this road will finally lead the imperialist aggressors. I say categorically that we shall answer the 340 missiles, with which Mr. McNamara has been threatening us, with the simultaneous strike of a several times greater number of missiles and with such a power of nuclear charges as will completely sweep off the face of the earth all objects -- the industrial, administrative and political centres of the United States -- and will completely annihilate the countries which have made their territories available for United States military bases."

I draw your attention to the following words from the passage I have just quoted:

"I say categorically that we shall answer the 340 missiles, with which Mr. McNamara has been threatening us, with the simultaneous strike of a several times greater number of missiles and with such a power..."

It follows quite clearly from this text, General Burns, that NATO has neither qualitative nor quantitative superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles. Consequently, General Burns, the ground slips away also from under this argument with which you try to justify your refusal to accept the Soviet proposal for the destruction of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage of disarmament. If we were to adopt your point of view about maintaining military advantages, then it is the Soviet Union which should put forward such claims. But we reject such a militaristic approach, which is

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

utterly contrary to the cause of peace and to the cause of disarmament. We insist upon and demand negotiations on real disarmament measures; we are opposed to idle and irrelevant twaddle. The comedy which is being played by the Western Powers in our negotiations in Geneva, while in Washington, Paris, Bonn and other places feverish activities are going on, aimed at intensifying still further the preparations of the NATO Powers for a nuclear missile war, is increasingly irritating and exasperating the peoples, who demand the cessation of the armaments race and of military preparations and call for disarmament. The peoples of the world want the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war, they yearn for a lasting peace. We cannot but protest against the openly militaristic approach of the Western Powers to the matter of disarmament. It is axiomatic to everyone that the genuine security of States and peoples is not ensured by superiority in the quantity or quality of armaments or by strategic advantages or superiority in any particular field of military preparations. All those are temporary, transitory circumstances, especially in the light of the tremendous development of science and technology in these days. Those who yesterday were lagging behind in something are today already catching up with the most advanced and tomorrow they may be in the lead. That is why the genuine security of States and peoples lies in disarmament. The first step that must be taken to strengthen that security is resolutely to eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war.

We had no wish to raise general questions again, but we have been compelled to do so in view of the statement made by the United States representative. We take the stand that the Committee should not be drawn into controversies, but that it should proceed in earnest to reach agreement on the main questions, one of which is the Soviet proposal put forward by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 21 September 1962 at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1127 (provisional) p.38). In regard to that question there is sufficient clarity to make the reaching of agreement possible. We have explained in detail our approach to the question of the number of missiles to be retained by the United States and by the Soviet Union. The indication contained in our proposal that the number of missiles will be agreed upon is in itself quite sufficient to enable the Western Powers to adopt in principle a positive position in regard to this Soviet proposal (ENDC/2/Rev 1, Art. 5). What can prevent acceptance of a proposal which especially stipulates that

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

the numbers are to be agreed upon? After all, if there is no general agreement between the sides, then there is no sense in talking about figures or numbers. What is the situation with regard to this question?

We said to the Western Powers: "Explain your views regarding the number of missiles to be retained. We shall study them and then we shall be able to begin real negotiations." As far as we are concerned, we have already stated our views as to the direction in which we should act and as to the criteria to be used for defining the number of missiles to be retained, namely, we should seek agreement in such a way that that agreement would contribute to the accomplishment of the most urgent task — the task of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war.

However, from the Western Powers we have heard in reply statements which, for all one's goodwill, cannot be taken as an indication of their desire to seek agreement. Today these statements have been repeated by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber (supra, p.15). First of all, they try to ascribe to us some far-fetched concept of "minimum deterrence" or "effect". It was precisely in this that the Canadian representative, General Burns, exercised his ingenuity (ENDC/PV.117, p.8). If we consider carefully the ideas which he expressed, we see that concealed behind the verbal husk of statements about the neutralization of "concealed" means of delivery is an obvious attempt to justify the maintenance of the present situation, where the armaments race is being constantly intensified.

The representatives of the Western Powers have spoken a good deal about control over the implementation of our proposal for the retention in the Soviet Union and the United States of an agreed number of missiles of a certain category. In doing so, they tried to make out that the position of the Soviet Union was still not clear and that something still needed to be explained and clarified. Of course, one can go on putting more and more new questions without end. But what need is there for all that? What do these tactics of the Western Powers lead to? Of course, it sometimes happens that questions are put because of a sincere desire to understand the position of the other side for the purpose of trying to achieve agreement. In such cases the Soviet Union is prepared to explain its position patiently in the hope that this will lead to removing the existing differences. But it is quite a different matter when by putting questions and delving into petty details the intention is to bog down the idea itself, to gain time and to cover up one's refusal of disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is precisely this last way that was chosen by the representatives of the Western Powers when, closing their eyes to the clear indications and explanations we have given in regard to this question, they continued to repeat that something was unclear to them.

Let us turn to the facts. For the sake of the speediest possible achievement of an agreement we took an important step towards meeting the Western Powers. The Soviet Union agreed (ENDC/PV.114, p.40) that international inspectors should verify the remaining number of missiles right at the launching sites. There is no need to emphasize that this directly meets the position of the Western Powers on the question of control. But this obviously did not satisfy our Western partners in the negotiations. They immediately rearranged their arguments and began to complain that the position of the Soviet Union in general on control over general and complete disarmament is now unclear to them.

Here, gentlemen, is an interesting example of the tactics of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, who said at our meeting on 3 April:

"If I have interpreted Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks correctly, I think that they represent an encouraging move forward ...

"Having said that, however, I would express the hope that our Soviet colleague and his Government will draw the logical conclusion from their apparently new approach to the admittedly difficult problem of verification of remainders in the disarmament field as a whole. In any case, I hope that Mr. Tsarapkin will elaborate for us the full meaning of his remarks to which I have just referred." (ENDC/PV.117, p.16)

The statements made by the United States representative and the Canadian representative were in the same vein. (ibid., pp.5-13, 17-26).

Before the eyes of the Committee the Western representatives themselves juggled the cards and in place of the question of control over the implementation of the Soviet proposal for the retention in the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited and agreed number of missiles, there suddenly appeared on the scene the question of control over general and complete disarmament in general. Here you have an example of another attempt by the Western Powers to complicate the issue and to avoid reaching agreement.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In the manoeuvre of raising questions about control we see reflected as in a mirror the desire of the Western Powers to avoid reaching agreement by asking various far-fetched questions and delving into details. This is real obstruction on the part of the Western Powers which is forcing our Committee to work to no purpose. But this is precisely the position from which the Soviet Union seeks to escape by proposing to reach agreement in principle first and then, unhindered, to set about elucidating the technical details.

But let us take a look at the remarks of the Western Powers as regards the substance. Four Western representatives repeated in unison the need for control over all existing armaments. At the meeting on 3 April the United States representative, Mr. Mark, said:

"What we would be anxious to know is whether there were any undeclared launching sites which had been built or retained clandestinely in violation of the treaty. We should also want to learn whether there was any clandestine stockpile of missiles or any clandestine production of such armaments. To have adequate assurance on those points would require a much more extensive and carefully devised arrangement than the mere inspection of declared sites."

(ENDC/PV.117, p.26)

But what do all these arguments of Mr. Mark's mean? It is obvious that all these arguments of his mean just one thing -- extension of 'control over the whole territory of a country in the first stage of disarmament. Nothing less will satisfy Mr. Mark. This demand, of course, is absurd and groundless.

We must note that the demands of the Western Powers for the establishment of control over existing armaments have long been discredited. The Western Powers, apparently having realized the complete hopelessness of their demands, gave up their attempts to impose verification of everything without any disarmament measures. In order to make their position on control less odious in the eyes of world public opinion, they fished out their plans for so-called zonal, selective inspection (ENDC/30, p.14). We have already criticized more than once this, save the mark, new approach of the Western Powers to the problem of control and therefore we shall not dwell upon it now.

There is another interesting point. With regard to their proposals, the Western Powers speak of selective inspection. Thus at the meeting of the Committee on 3 April the representative of Canada, General Burns, said:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"Implementation of progressive across-the-board percentage cuts in all categories of major armaments as proposed in the United States plan would not require measures of total verification over the whole territory of States at the outset of the disarmament process." (ENDC/PV.117, p.11)

But when it comes to the Soviet proposals on the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a limited number of missiles, the Western representatives raise the question of inspection of the whole territory of the countries.

In the heat of polemics against our proposal the representatives of the Western Powers put forward yet another directly contradictory argument, which we cannot ignore. Its meaning is that the proposal of the Soviet Union for the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles provides for too great and extensive control, which the Western Powers would like to avoid. This is a very strange position.

But what can be said about this argument? Yes, the Soviet Union is decidedly in favour of effective and wide international control when it comes to real disarmament. We propose that when all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are being eliminated inspectors of the international organization should verify on the spot the destruction of missiles, military aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery systems which could be used as the means of delivery of such weapons (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Articles 5-8.). The international inspectors would be able to verify the transfer to peaceful production of all plants now engaged in the production of missiles, bombers and other nuclear weapon carriers. They would be present at the launching sites whenever a missile is launched for peaceful purposes so as to witness the launching and thoroughly inspect every missile, every satellite and every cosmic ship before it is sent into the skies.

In objecting to the Soviet proposal for extensive control over the remaining missiles, the Western Powers show that they do not want either disarmament or wide international control, if this control is connected with real disarmament measures. Their ideas are directed towards something else. At the present time, as in the past, they oppose to our clear and precise proposals their demand that the whole territory of States and their defence systems should be opened up at the very outset of disarmament. In other words, they are interested in military intelligence and not in real and honest control over disarmament. This demand is utterly contrary to the interests of disarmament and security and is the major obstacle in the path to the achievement of agreement.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In order to hasten the achievement of agreement on the Soviet proposal, we have given the Western Powers answers to the questions in which they are interested. These were straightforward answers, after which, in the normal course of negotiation, one might have expected some positive reaction from the Western representatives.

But the Eighteen-Nation Committee is faced with an attempt by the Western Powers to lead it further and further away from the substance of the matter. Questions are being raised which have no direct bearing on the matter. In general the Western Powers are carrying on obstructive tactics in regard to the Soviet proposal.

In fact, since the submission of this Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, except for an agreed and strictly limited number of missiles to be retained until the end of the second stage by the Soviet Union and the United States, a favourable opportunity has been created to reduce considerably the threat of a nuclear missile war. It now depends upon the Western Powers whether events will develop in this direction or whether everything will remain as before and the threat of a nuclear missile war will continue to grow from day to day. But we are faced with an imperative necessity which demands that we take all possible measures to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. It is obvious that agreement should be achieved on the basis of the Soviet proposal and it is now for the Western Powers to speak.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy)(translation from French): Much could be said on the very long controversial speech that Mr. Tsarapkin made this morning. My delegation reserves the right to reply to it at a later meeting. However, some of the remarks made by Mr. Tsarapkin this morning with regard to co-operation between the Western countries call for a very brief immediate answer from me. He said, in effect, that in our co-operation we were under pressures incompatible with the will of our peoples. I realize the Soviet delegation's inability to understand the co-operation and participation of the Western peoples, and particularly of the peoples of western Europe, in the West's defensive and peaceful organization. This is perhaps hard for the Soviet delegation to comprehend, as it is readier to see compulsion and oppression than the free expression of our opinions and our will, readier to see machinations by the Western militarists than the democratic professions of our peoples. That fact I sincerely deplore. May I, however, assure Mr. Tsarapkin

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

that, so far as concerns our decisions, nothing is done against the will of our people, nothing that is not in accord with that will and with our democratic rules. That will is for the maintenance of peace without the abandonment of our security. That will is for co-operation with all peoples, not only our associates in the West but also those whose social and economic systems differ from ours. We cannot renounce the preservation and joint defence of the concepts and ideals we share with our friends in the West. We shall, alas, be unable to do so until, through balanced disarmament, peace is finally established between us. We naturally wish to see an early rebirth of trust and an early achievement of general and complete disarmament. That is the spirit informing all our appeals to the Soviet delegation.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to speak briefly as representative of the United States. I wish to refer only to the general remarks made by the Soviet representative.

Mr. Tsarapkin said a great deal about the will and the desires of the peoples of the world, and he sought to claim that United States policy and, in particular, United States and Western disarmament proposals set themselves against the will of the peoples of the world. The United States sincerely believes that its proposals are in accordance with the will and desires of the peoples of the world. We have entitled our plan for general and complete disarmament "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world" (ENDC/30, and Add. 1,2). We believe that it is designed to bring about a peaceful world, and we know that a peaceful world is the aspiration of all the peoples.

For arriving at, and maintaining, a peaceful world two of the agreed principles in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations seem to us to be particularly applicable. The first is the principle, familiar to all of us, which calls for the development of peacekeeping machinery. It says:

"Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means" (ENDC/5, p.3),

(The Chairman, United States)

and it goes on to spell out how that should be accomplished. It is our belief that it must and will be accomplished. There must be international peacekeeping machinery to maintain the peace, and it must be strong enough to maintain the peace. Until that machinery is adequately developed however -- and we hope that its development will be speedy -- we think all must recognize that protection against aggression lies, perhaps unhappily as our United Kingdom colleague has pointed out, in the power of national forces to bring swift retribution to the aggressor.

Therefore there is another of the agreed principles which we believe is highly important during the disarmament process; it is the principle which says:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any State or group of States gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all." (ibid. p.2)

We do not believe that the Soviet proposals meet that principle. We believe that our proposals do. We are quite ready to discuss in great detail how the proposals can be brought closer together while preserving that principle. We must be realistic: neither of the powerful military sides is going to accept -- is going to be misled into accepting -- arrangements which do not fit in with its peace and security. We hope that the Soviet delegation and its allies will come to accept that reality in the near future.

May I now, as Chairman, report on the present situation with regard to a recess. The Committee will remember that on 5 April, in an informal portion of our plenary meeting, the United States delegation proposed that there should be a recess from 11 April to 7 May. In making that proposal the United States delegation said that it was, of course, subject to the views of other delegations, and added that, because of lack of agreement between the two Co-Chairmen, an agreed recommendation by them with regard to a recess was not feasible.

There were informal discussions in this Committee again on Friday and on Monday. In the course of those discussions no arrangement was reached on a longer recess, but it was agreed that the Committee should not meet on Friday of this week and Monday of next week, days on which meetings would normally have been held. Since then there have been further informal discussions yesterday and this morning on the subject. As Chairman, I should report to the Committee that there

(The Chairman, United States)

remain certain delegations that do not believe a recess is advisable, but also there appears to be a general consensus that, in addition to not meeting on Friday of this week and Monday of next week, the Committee should have a further recess until 7 May. Accordingly, in deference to that general consensus, I propose as Chairman, in reading the communique, to set the date for the next meeting at 7 May.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): At a time when the eyes of the whole world are directed towards this building, when everybody is anxiously awaiting the announcement of an agreement on the cessation of tests, our co-Chairmen wish to surprise the world by the announcement of an agreement about a recess. World public opinion will rightly ask whether our Committee has encountered a new element which warranted the stopping of its work for consultation with the respective governments or whether it had overworked, become tired and needed some rest, or whether this announcement of a recess, with no accompanying announcement of some measure of success with regard to tests, is an acknowledgement of its failure. It is obvious that the answer to the first two questions should be in the negative. What are we to say about the doubts which such a recess would create in the minds of the world with regard to our prospects for success?

I should like to put on record the position of the United Arab Republic delegation: namely, that we do not find any justification for such a recess. Rather, we see it as an untimely impediment to our negotiations and to our efforts to find a compromise solution, efforts which have so far, unfortunately, not produced success. Again, we see in the recess much loss of valuable time which could be put to better use in order to reach even a preliminary measure of agreement on the cessation of tests. Naturally our co-Chairmen have complete freedom of action when it comes to recommending certain procedures, but my delegation fails to see the logic of this step and we are afraid also lest world public opinion should give it another interpretation.

I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to say that my delegation has tried to contribute, to the limit of its modest abilities to the presentation of some concrete, practical and honourable compromise proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock in the test ban negotiations. I am referring now to my delegation's contribution of 18 February 1963 (ENDC/PV.99, pp.9 et seq). We believe that many of our

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

country's proposals on that date are still valid and represent a most useful basis for any possible mutual agreement, if such an agreement is really desired. Our apparent silence since then should not be taken to mean that we lack interest in the matter or that we feel we have reached the end of the road. Indeed, we were engaged in trying to come forward with yet another, or greater, contribution, perhaps in conjunction with other delegations of non-aligned countries at this Conference. Much as we should have liked to have done so, even today, and much as my delegation remains convinced of the basic truth, the wisdom and the value of such a contribution, we are very sorry that we cannot tell the Committee today that it is possible for that contribution to see the light of day -- and that for reasons completely beyond my delegation's control.

When my delegation today advocates the continuation of our work it is because of its desire that the great nuclear Powers should make it possible for some of the delegations of non-aligned countries to resume their efforts to find compromise solutions, and thus make it possible for those States which want to fulfil their mission and their mandate from the United Nations, and from the non-aligned world at large, to do so.

It may be argued that the period suggested for a recess was not long enough to enable the delegations of the non-aligned countries to produce any valuable contribution. However, as we see it, it would have given the delegations of non-aligned countries, or some of them at least, the chance to reconsider their position in this Committee and to assess the value of their presence. It might also have helped them to make up their minds about the elaboration of this last point and the possibility of explaining it further at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Finally, it may be said that our co-Chairmen have the right to recommend what they see fit, but we feel it is our right also to be able to tell them what we believe to be right and just.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Speaking as United States representative, I should just like to make it clear that what I said about the recess this morning in my capacity as Chairman was not an agreed recommendation of the co-Chairmen. There was no agreement by the co-Chairmen to make a recommendation for a recess. What I said in my capacity as Chairman was an honest attempt to

(The Chairman, United States)

reflect what I had been given to understand was the prevailing consensus among members of the Committee. I said that certain delegations remained convinced that a recess was not advisable and, in view specifically of the statement of the representative of the United Arab Republic, I should say that the Soviet representative was among those members.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Having heard with understanding and sharing the concern that has just been voiced by the representative of the United Arab Republic, and in order to do away with any misunderstanding about the Soviet delegation's attitude in regard to the question of a recess, I should like to make it clear once again that, as we have already stated, the Soviet Union is opposed to a long recess. In view of the established tradition it has already been agreed here to have a recess of a few days. We do not object to that, but we consider that it would not be in the interests of our common cause to arrange for a long recess, such as that proposed by the representative of the United States, namely, from 11 April to 7 May.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I have been instructed to state that the Canadian view is that a recess would be premature at this stage and that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should therefore continue its work without interruption. We had hoped that suggestions for overcoming the present impasse in the nuclear test ban negotiations would have been presented by now, but we have heard from the representative of the United Arab Republic that difficulties have arisen which have prevented that. If those suggestions had been presented it might have been worth while to have had a recess after they had been discussed here preliminarily. But, as that is not the case, I must say that the Canadian delegation is unable to favour a lengthy recess at this time.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): Taking into consideration the situation which now exists in the Committee, my delegation feels that a recess at this particular moment would be timely. We have been here now for eight weeks during which time we have not moved one inch forward. I simply cannot imagine that we can go on in this fashion meeting three times a week, listening to the same speeches, the same

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

arguments, trying to fool ourselves into the belief that somehow, from somewhere, a solution is going to drop out of the skies. Therefore, my delegation thinks that the time has come for what might be called a real stock-taking, and that can only be undertaken by our Governments.

For this reason my delegation favours an immediate recess, but a recess for a longer period than you have just announced, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of my delegation I should like to suggest that such a recess might be of three months' duration in the first instance.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The Romanian delegation is against a long recess. We are here to work. We have before us a heavy agenda containing many problems to be solved. We are not here to recess every month or every two months. We are in favour of a short recess, if we need it -- and perhaps we do need it. But I say again that we are against the long recess proposed by you, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as United States representative.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I realize very well the strong feelings that have been expressed this morning from two rather different aspects. I realize acutely the feeling that we have not made the progress which we would all wish to have made. It is idle to apportion blame. I do believe we have a duty, however, to keep on in our endeavours to make progress. I myself was willing to fall in with any arrangement which was to the mutual benefit of representatives here, whether for a long or a short recess, but I should be very reluctant indeed to agree to a recess of the length suggested by our colleague from Burma. I believe that we must return here relatively soon. It is one thing to have time to go back and reassess the position in a few weeks, but such a long recess, I believe, is not what is required. As I say, whether it be a few days or a few weeks, the United Kingdom delegation is willing to fall in with the feelings of the majority.

I sense also the feeling of frustration there is here today. Our United Arab Republic colleague has expressed it with great sincerity. Possibly it might be better if we had a week or two now in which to see if we cannot overcome some of the difficulties to which he referred in passing, and therefore it might be that the best thing would be to have a recess of a week or two. But, as I say, I am not devoted to any particular day or dates.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I noted that our Soviet colleague said that he was opposed to a long recess, but he did not specify how long he thought was reasonable. My purpose in speaking is to make quite clear my own conviction that, whatever frustration we may feel here, we have a duty to go on with our work. Therefore, as I say, I could not support a recess of the length suggested by the representative of Burma.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): With regard to the question now under discussion the Bulgarian delegation has received instructions from its Government enjoining it to go on working assiduously, in agreement with the other members of the Committee, for an agreement on the questions before the Committee. We agree with the representative of the United Arab Republic that with sustained work now some progress might be made. We should therefore like to state that we also are against the long recess suggested by some delegations. Our view is that the recess proposed by the United States representative is a long one and the one we decided upon the other day, that is to say, that we should not work on Friday or Monday, is a short one. However, if a majority of the Committee think it necessary for their own personal reasons and, particularly, if they hope that after they have reconsidered their positions on certain questions we might resume our work after some time with more chance of reaching an agreement, we shall not oppose their view.

At the same time we wish to state that our delegation is ready to work without interruption and that it objects to long vacations like those proposed by the United States representative, who said that he has the support of the majority on the point. However, if there are reasons why we should have a recess, we shall not oppose the will of the majority.

Mr. LALL (India): I should just like to say that on the question of a recess I find myself very much in agreement with the sentiments expressed by the representative of the United Arab Republic; and I believe those sentiments were echoed in some measure or least by our United Kingdom colleague.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): I have just said that we are opposed to the three weeks recess because we can put that time to better use working here in the Committee. However, if the Conference decided that it needed stocktaking and reconsideration by the Governments then I would recommend following the procedure suggested by the representative of Burma, or I would even go so far as to suggest that our Committee adjourn sine die, and that it might be possible for the co-Chairmen to summon us back to a meeting when they had decided that the presence of the non-aligned delegations and other delegations could be of some value.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I agree with the view expressed by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, and I should like to add that, while I understand to some extent the disappointment some delegations feel, I think it would not be right for our Committee to adjourn today on such a pessimistic note. We have worked very painstakingly in recent weeks, and I think that for the first time in our Committee an initial agreement has been reached. For the first time we have found the Soviet delegation accepting a Western proposal (ENDC/PV.118, p.52). That is already something gained. Of course we all hoped for greater success and the realization of our basic aspiration: an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. But it must not be forgotten that even on that subject some progress has been recorded. The Western Powers have reduced the number of inspections requested at the beginning of the session, and we now have before us a complete proposal on inspection procedures. Quite frankly, our work cannot be said to have been vain.

I personally think that a moderate recess, like that proposed, might give not only the governments of countries belonging to military alliances but also the governments of non-aligned countries an opportunity to re-assess the situation and see what further help their delegations can give us when we resume. In that connexion we recall with appreciation the help these delegations have given the Committee in the past. We have all been sincerely and deeply grateful for their co-operation in our work. We hope that their contribution will be even more worth while in the future. We have a recess in prospect, and the respective governments of those countries will have plenty of time to review the situation. I sincerely trust that when we resume our proceedings next month those countries' delegations will be ready to make a positive and constructive contribution to our work.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): My delegation associates itself fully with the views expressed by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and of Burma. I think it is right to say that we assembled here eight weeks ago with great optimism and in a very congenial atmosphere, and if we are to salvage what is left of that congenial atmosphere it might be a good thing for us to adjourn sine die. When the situation improves, we can come back and try again.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I must say quite frankly that we see no serious grounds for interrupting the work of our Committee for several weeks, that is until 7 May, as you suggest. We think that interruptions in the Committee's work should be minimal both as regards their number and duration. We must not forget that the Committee has been set up by the General Assembly as a permanently functioning body for disarmament negotiations and, from that point of view, any unwarranted recesses in its work could hardly be justified, especially as a number of most important and urgent questions are on our agenda and these should not be shelved. However, one has only to glance at the report (ENDC/83) which we have today adopted in accordance with the General Assembly resolution (A/RES/1767(XVII) - ENDC/64) to realize that it offers no occasion for any approval. The formal nature of this report shows quite clearly that the results of our negotiations since the last recess are extremely unsatisfactory. This circumstance alone should inspire us rather with a desire to increase our efforts to achieve positive results than with a desire for a longer recess. For all these reasons and in accordance with the instructions of my delegation, we are opposed to a long recess.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to speak as representative of the United States. The proposal of the United States delegation that there should be a recess from 11 April until 7 May was made on the express condition of its being acceptable to the other delegations, and therefore we solicited the views of other delegations. My statement as Chairman this morning was made on the understanding that, as I had been given to believe, there was a consensus that such a recess would be acceptable to the majority of the delegations. As there does not seem to be such a consensus I propose, as representative of the United States, that we merely register in the communiqué the agreement which has already been reached at our private meeting, and that the next meeting of the Committee be held on Wednesday, 17 April.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and twentieth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stellett, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, the Soviet Union, the United States, Romania, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Italy, the United Arab Republic, Canada, Burma, Nigeria and Czechoslovakia.

"The Conference adopted a progress report^{1/} for the period 26 November 1962 to 10 April 1963, to be transmitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 17 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.

^{1/} ENDC/83

